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Abstract-Existing methods for traffic resilience at the net­
work and transport layers typically work in isolation, often resort­
ing to inference in fault detection and recovery respectively. This 
both duplicates functionality across layers, eroding efficiency, and 
leads to protracted recovery cycles, affecting responsiveness. Such 
misalignment is particularly at odds with the unprecedented 
concentration of traffic in data-centers, in which network and 
hosts are managed in unison. 
This paper advocates instead a cross-layer approach to traffic 
resilience. The proposed architecture, INFLEX, builds on the 
abstractions provided by software-defined networking (SDN) to 
maintain multiple virtual forwarding planes which the network 
assigns to flows. In case of path failure, transport protocols pro­
actively request to switch plane in a manner which is unilaterally 
deployable by an edge domain, providing scalable end-to-end 
forwarding path resilience. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite being broadly designed for robustness, the current 
Internet architecture remains remarkably vulnerable to failures. 
Managing faults still poses a significant operational challenge, 
in part because faults can occur at every layer of the net­
working stack, and can affect any element along a network 
path. This inherent diversity has traditionally favoured placing 
resilience mechanisms at the transport layer. Since endpoints 
possess both intrinsic knowledge of application needs and 
fine-grained measurements on end-to-end path characteristics, 
transport protocols offer a natural fit for providing scalable 
resilience. Modern transport protocols such as Stream Con­
trol Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [1] and Multipath TCP 
(MPTCP) [2] address resilience by providing transparent fail­
over through multihoming. Unfortunately, neither is likely to 
be widely deployed in the near future, with the former lack­
ing critical middlebox support and the latter still undergoing 
standardization. This is compounded by the fact that end-host 
multihoming in itself poses a barrier to deployment. Finally, 
both SCTP and MPTCP, being confined to the transport layer, 
rely only on knowledge of faults within an individual flow. 
Hence, each flow must detect failures independently, even 
when many flows are affected by the same fault. 
An alternative approach to resilience is to target the net­
work layer, hence shifting the onus of resilience from the 
endpoints to the network operators. Traditionally, this has 
been achieved by designing improved routing algorithms. The 
deployment of real time applications with harder constraints 
on reliability coupled with better failure detection methods 
embedded in linecards have provided both the motivation and 
the means for achieving sub-second recovery within Interior 
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Gateway Protocol (lGP) networks [3]. Even with reduced re­
covery times however, the transient effects of routing changes 
can still disrupt the forwarding path. Other frameworks [4], 
[5], [6] have been proposed to provide repair paths for use 
between the detection of a failure and the convergence of the 
routing process. Unfortunately, such methods are rarely suffi­
cient. Firstly, their application is circumscribed to individual 
domains, and as such cannot provide end-to-end coverage in 
a federated, best-effort Internet. In order to detect failures in 
remote domains, an operator may employ active monitoring 
techniques [7], but such approaches can neither scale to cover 
most destinations nor operate at a small enough timescale 
to ensure timely recovery. Secondly, there are many faults 
which do not directly pertain to routing [8], such as middlebox 
misconfiguration or hardware malfunctions. For these kinds 
of faults, routing-based approaches are completely ineffective. 
Finally, fault reparation purely at the network layer often 
disregards (and can even potentially disrupt) the transport layer 
by causing out-of-order delivery of packets. 
Software-Defined networking (SDN) [9] is a promising tool 
for improving network resilience. By decoupling the control 
and data planes, SDN provides vastly improved flexibility 
for scalable, policy-based network control. However, network 
resilience problems cannot be solved by this flexibility alone. 
Instead, what is needed is a cross-layer approach that bridges 
the gap between the transport and the network layers and 
provides end-to-end insight into network routing decisions. 
This paper presents INFLEX, an SDN-based architecture 
for cross-layer network resilience which provides on-demand 
path fail-over for IP traffic. INFLEX operates by allowing 
an SDN-enabled routing layer to expose multiple routing 
planes to the transport layer. Hence, traffic can be shifted 
by one routing plane to another as a response to end-to-end 
failure detection. INFLEX then operates as an extension to the 
network abstraction provided by IP, and can be used by any 
transport protocols. While this architecture requires changes 
across both network and host, it is deployable because it can 
be adopted unilaterally, providing benefits even when used by 
individual domains, and is inherently end-to-end, potentially 
covering third party failures. 
At the host, the proposed architecture allows transport 
protocols to switch network paths at a timescale which avoids 
flow disruption and which can be transparently integrated into 
existing congestion control mechanisms. Within the network, 
INFLEX provides both greater insight into end-to-end path 
quality, assisting fault detection, and more control over flow 
path assignment, enabling more effective fault recovery. In ad­
dition to describing our architecture design and justifying our 
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design choices with extensive network measurements, we also 
implement INFLEX and verify its operation experimentally. 
We make our modifications to both the TCP/IP network stack 
and a popular OpenFlow controller [10] publicly available. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 
II provides a brief background on software-defined networks. 
Section III reviews some of the design decisions in the light 
of longitudinal measurements performed on the MA WI dataset 
[11]. An overview of the proposed architecture is the presented 
in Section IV, followed by an evaluation of INFLEX in Section 
V. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VII. 
II. OPENFLOW BACKGROUND 
Software defined networks decouple the data plane and 
control plane, allowing both to evolve independently. A tradi­
tional instantiation of a software defined network for datacen­
ters is shown in Figure 1. Each physical host runs a number of 
virtual machines, each connected locally through a software­
based edge switch (such as Open vSwitch [12]) running on 
the underlying physical host operating system. This switch 
is in turn connected to further forwarding devices, ensuring 
access to a wider network. The forwarding logic of each device 
can be accessed and configured by a controller through the 
establishment of a control channel through a common protocol, 
of which OpenFlow is the most widely used [9]. Both software 
and physical switches are indistinguishable from a controller's 
perspective: how a device implements OpenFlow is immaterial, 
so long as a forwarding device conforms to the given API. 
An OpenFlow flow table is composed of multiple flow 
entries. Each flow entry is comprised of a pattern to be 
matched, and the corresponding instructions to be executed. 
The match fields over which an entry can be compared span 
from data link to transport layers, covering not only source 
and destination addresses at each protocol header, but also 
traffic classes and labels for VLAN, MPLS and IPv4 headers. 
Additionally, a counter keeps track of the number of times the 
entry is matched. If more than one matching entry is found, 
only the entry with the highest priority is processed. Finally, 
each entry has a pair of timeout values: a soft timeout, within 
which an entry is expired if no matching packet arrives, and 
a hard timeout, by which an entry is irrevocably expired. If 
neither timeout is set, a flow entry persists indefinitely. 
An Open Flow switch in turn maintains multiple flow tables. 
Every packet received at an OpenFlow compliant switch is 
processed along a pipeline which starts by matching the 
packet against table O. From this first, default table, cor­
responding instructions may redirect the packet for further 
matching against another table, thereby chaining processing. 
This pipeline processing ceases once a matching entry fails to 
include a redirection request, with the accumulated instruction 
set being executed. In addition to redirections, valid instruc­
tions include modifying packet fields, pushing and popping 
packet tags, and defining through which ports a packet should 
be forwarded. If at any point no matching entry is found, 
the packet is buffered at the switch, and the truncated packet 
header is sent to the controller. Based on the header contents, a 
controller may decide to install a new flow entry on the switch, 
or allow the packet to be dropped altogether. Compared to 
the underlying, abstracted network elements which compose 
the data path, the controller is often expected to be entirely 
software based, and as such is not constrained in how it 
should process packets. In practice, this freedom is curbed as 
increasing complexity at the controller both reduces the rate 
at which packets are processed, as well as increasing latency 
for packets buffered at the switch. 
The overall performance of the described architecture is 
subject to two further critical tradeoffs. Firstly, the granularity 
at which flow entries are installed determines how often a 
controller is called to intervene. While installing an entry at a 
flow granularity may allow fine-grained control of resources, 
it increases both the load on the controller and the latency of 
the withheld packet. Conversely, as the granularity becomes 
coarser, the overhead incurred by the controller is reduced at 
the cost of flexibility in controlling traffic. Secondly, controller 
placement is critical [13]. At one extreme, a fully centralized 
controller is omniscient within a domain at the expense of 
reliability and scalability. At the other, a distributed system of 
controllers forsakes consistency and Iiveness in order to scale. 
III. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
SDN provides an abstraction over which different archi­
tectural paradigms can be adapted and even coexist. It does 
not however prescribe or advocate a specific design - net­
work practitioners must still consider system properties when 
grappling with fundamental tradeoffs affecting consistency, 
isolation, reliability and efficiency. 
This section provides design considerations for scalable 
traffic management based on observations obtained across a 
longitudinal analysis of interdomain traffic. The dataset used 
is a five year subset of the unanonymized MAWI traces [11], 
spanning from late 2006 to early 2012. In addition to the 
raw packet traces, collected for 15 minutes every day, both 
source and destination IPs are mapped to the respective AS 
by reconstructing archived BGP routing dumps archived at 
routeviews. Both routing information and traffic traces are 
collected from the same point - within the WIDE AS - which 
provides transit for a Japanese research network. 
Ideally resilience could be implemented at the transport 
layer alone, for the same motives rate control is best left to end­
hosts: ultimately, the host is best positioned to detect end-to­
end path faults and can often react over shorter timescales than 
the network, which must concern itself with reconvergence. 
This approach for path fail-over was a significant feature in 
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Fig, 2: Longitudinal traffic properties for the MAWI dataset. Fig. 3: INFLEX stack. 
SCTP [1]. Unfortunately, deployment of SCTP has been neg­
ligible in over a decade since standardization, in part because 
the pervasiveness of middleboxes has significantly affected the 
ability for new transport protocols to be deployed. More re­
cently Multipath TCP [2] has been proposed addressing many 
of the same concerns as SCTP whilst maintaining the same 
wire format as TCP, thereby ensuring middlebox compatibility. 
Despite this, widespread deployment is far from guaranteed, 
and is largely tied to the rate of as adoption. As a reference 
point, Figure 2a tracks the use of the TCP windowscale option 
by overall volume in flows and bytes across both directions 
in the MAWI dataset. Without windowscale negotiation, a 
sender's congestion window cannot exceed 65KB. Despite 
offering a clear benefit to both endpoints, being simple to 
implement and incurring a low overhead, windowscale deploy­
ment has only recently picked up momentum, two decades 
since standardization. Expecting substantial deployment of a 
more complex and costly extension such as MPTCP over the 
near future is likely optimistic. Critically, transport extensions 
require receiver adoption and are therefore subject to the 
willingness and ability of users to upgrade their as. 
Receiver side deployment of even modest TCP exten­
sions can be protracted, even when incentives are aligned. 
Rather than proposing a path for incremental deployment, this 
work focuses on how to obtain similar benefits immediately 
- modifying sender side hosts only. A host, however, cannot 
directly affect routing without changing destination address, 
which would break legacy TCP receiver side implementations. 
Additional extensions are required on the sender side network 
to enable multipath forwarding. Conventional wisdom suggests 
that maintaining parallel routing planes requires a proportional 
increase in table size [14], which itself can be subject to 
exponential growth. In practice however, this state can be sig­
nificantly reduced by forsaking coverage for a small proportion 
of traffic. Rather than reflect the entirety of its potential path 
diversity for all traffic, an edge provider can instead provide 
additional routing planes for only a subset of popular prefixes. 
The extent to which such a gain is possible for the MAWI 
dataset is quantified in Figure 2b, which displays the cumula­
tive distribution function of outbound traffic across network 
prefixes announced by BGP neighbours. Over five years, 
traffic to approximately 340,000 unique prefixes was observed. 
Invariably however, an increasing amount is sent to a small 
group of prefixes - by 2011, over 50% of traffic went to the 
top 100 prefixes alone. This reflects ongoing structural changes 
in the Internet architecture as content providers interconnect 
directly edge, eyeball networks, and content becomes increas­
ingly consolidated across a set of large content providers and 
national and regional ISPs. 
Multipath routing state can be significantly reduced 
by covering fewer destinations while still benefiting most 
traffic. Within the MAWI dataset virtually all inbound and 
outbound traffic could be mapped to 10,000 unique network 
prefixes. Existing SDN tools such as RouteFlow [15] are 
already capable of overlaying routing on commodity switches, 
but the incurred overhead can still be a concern for produc­
tion networks. Rather than address the scalability challenges 
inherent to multipath routing directly, these results suggest that 
a tangible deployment path lies instead in reducing the scope 
over which it is applied. 
IV. ARCHITECTURE 
This section describes INFLEX, an architecture which 
provides edge domains with greater end-to-end resilience. 
Rather than probing paths through active or passive means, 
the network delegates the responsibility for fault detection to 
end-hosts. The system relies on packet marking at the host 
to select a path through the local domain. This provides far 
greater scalability in terms of the proportion of traffic and 
destinations which can be covered, at the cost of requiring 
small changes to the end-host TCP/IP stack. INFLEX is 
therefore particularly suited for managed environments, such 
as datacenters or enterprise networks, which not only have 
greater control over the end-host operating system, but also 
generate large volumes of traffic towards destinations which 
cannot be readily upgraded. 
An overview of the proposed architecture as applied to a 
single domain is shown in Figure 4. Hosts are connected to 
the local network through an OpenFlow-enabled edge switch. 
While edge switches typically reside within each physical 
machine, alternative aggregation levels such as the top of 
rack or end of row may also be used. Each such switch is 
configured by a specialized controller which resides locally, 
referred to as an inflector. The local network is configured 
by a centralized routing controller to provide multiple virtual 
routing planes. While these planes are necessarily intradomain 
in scope, some degree of interdomain diversity can also be 
achieved by changing egress node. 
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Fig. 4: INFLEX architecture (above) and INFLEX header 
(below). The edge switch forwards traffic across virtual planes 
set up by a centralized routing service. 
The core of the architecture relies on repurposing the 
Differentiated services (DS) field in each IP packet to provide 
an in-band signalling channel between the end-host and the 
inflector. The header on inbound traffic is set by the edge 
switch and read by the host, and is used by the inflector to 
signal which plane a flow has been assigned to. The header 
on outbound traffic is set by the host and read by the edge 
switch, and is used by the transport protocol to ensure that all 
traffic for the flow is forwarded along the given plane. Hosts 
can request a new plane to be assigned by the inflector in 
case of an end-to-end path fault; this provides efficient cross­
layer failure recovery. The DS standard [16] reserves a pool 
of code points for local use identified by setting the right-most 
bit, henceforth referred to as the INFLEX flag. When set, the 
rest of the DS field should be interpreted as containing two 
fields, shown in Figure 4. An Interior Forwarding label, which 
determines the plane over which a packet is forwarded, and an 
echo bit, which explicitly signals a request from the host or a 
reply from the network. The remainder of the description of 
INFLEX is split across its main components: the end-hosts, 
the edge switch and the inflector. 
A. INFLEX end-hosts 
INFLEX hosts set the INF label of outbound packets 
according to the value assigned by the inflector, in a similar 
fashion to the path re-feedback mechanism introduced in [l7]. 
The changes required to support this at the sender side network 
stack are minimal, and are illustrated in Figure 3. Every 
transport connection occurs over a socket, a local structure 
containing the variables associated to the ongoing flow. At 
the network layer, the local socket has a DS value which is 
copied to every outbound packet (point 1). Within INFLEX, 
the transport protocol can trigger a request (point 2), which 
leads to a network response contained in incoming packets 
(point 3). 
Assume a transport protocol wishes to switch the plane it 
is currently assigned. With INFLEX, it can send an inflection 
request by setting the echo bit of the local DS field (point 2, 
Figure 3). All subsequent outbound packets will be marked 
with the resulting value. The network layer then proceeds to 
inspect inbound packets, waiting for a network response, as 
delineated in Figure 5. After demuxing an incoming packet, 
1 
2 if (is_inflex(pkt)) 
3 if (! is_inflex (sock) I I 
4 (is-pending(sock) && is_reply(pkt))) { 
5 copy_label (sock, pkt); 
6 clear_echo(sock); 
7 
8 
9 else if (is_inflex(sock)) 
10 clear_inflex(sock) 
11 
Fig. 5: Pseudo-code for packet reception using INFLEX. 
pkt, to the corresponding socket, sock, a receiver first verifies 
whether the INFLEX flag is set on the incoming packet 
(line 2), establishing whether the underlying network supports 
INFLEX for the given connection. The receiver must then 
decide whether it should change the virtual plane the socket is 
currently assigned. This can only happen under two conditions. 
Firstly, if the DS value for the current socket does not have 
the INFLEX flag set (line 3). This typically occurs on flow 
start, where a connection is spawned with a default DS value. 
Secondly, if the local DS value has the echo bit set, there 
is a pending inflection request. If the incoming packet has 
the same bit set, it corresponds to the network reply (line 4). 
Under both previous cases, the connection switches forwarding 
plane by copy the interior forwarding label from the incoming 
packet to the local socket, and setting the INFLEX flag (lines 
5-6). These changes are all applied at the IP layer - transport 
protocols need only to decide when to send inflection requests 
- while applications can remain unchanged. 
B. The edge switch 
The edge switch is primarily responsible for mapping IN­
FLEX marked packets to the appropriate forwarding plane. On 
start up its datapath is configured by the local inflector, which 
installs the appropriate flow entries on it in order to construct 
the processing pipeline in Figure 6. This pipeline can be 
partitioned into three distinct blocks, responsible for triaging, 
policing and inflecting packets. For clarity, the processing 
pipeline is conceptually described as a sequence of flow 
matches across distinct tables. In practice, an implementer is 
free to collapse flow tables and entries to improve performance. 
An important safeguard is that a legacy pipeline must be 
present, establishing a default forwarding plane expected to 
be used by traffic to which INFLEX is not applicable. 
The triage phase is responsible for distinguishing whether 
a packet is capable of using INFLEX. Firstly, INFLEX is only 
applicable to IP packets. Traffic is then differentiated according 
to the port on which the packet arrived: if connected to a host, 
the interface is said to be internal, otherwise it is external. 
Any inbound IP traffic may potentially be INFLEX capable 
and as such can proceed to the next stage. For outbound IP 
traffic, only packets with the INFLEX flag set require further 
processing. Packets for which this flag is not set are assumed 
to be legacy traffic. 
The policy phase decides whether a packet is permitted 
to use INFLEX. For either direction, a packet is compared 
against a policer table, which contains a set of rules describing 
local policy concerning INFLEX usage. The rules applied to 
Fig. 6: Pipeline installed to the edge switch datapath. 
each direction however may differ, particularly since outbound 
packets can be further scrutinized according to the INF label. 
For example, this allows the outbound policer to enforce which 
virtual planes are available to specific tenants or applications. 
For this reason, the action applied if a packet is matched 
within the policer table also differs according to direction. 
For inbound traffic, a matching rule indicates that the packet 
does not satisfy local requirements for INFLEX use, and is 
consequently treated as legacy traffic. For outbound traffic, 
a packet is already marked as being INFLEX capable. Any 
matching entry therefore indicates that it is in violation of 
local policy and should consequently be dropped. 
Finally, the inflex phase processes the respective header 
and forwards the packet. A packet is first matched against an 
inflection table in either direction. This table is detailed in the 
next section, and can be assumed to contain no matching entry 
initially. For outbound traffic, the packet is typically redirected 
to the plane mapped by the interior forwarding label. The one 
exception are inflection requests, which are forwarded to the 
local inflector for further processing. For inbound traffic, the 
INFLEX flag is marked in order to notify hosts that the flow is 
INFLEX capable, and the packet is then processed according 
to the legacy pipeline. 
C. The inflector 
Each edge switch is controlled by an inflector, an SDN 
controller expected to reside locally. An inflector is firstly 
responsible for configuring the underlying datapath according 
to the previously described pipeline. Secondly, an inflector 
must process inflection requests. 
Inflection requests require network intervention in assign­
ing a packet to a forwarding plane. The dynamic nature of 
this decision process cannot readily be instantiated as a set 
of static rules at the edge switch, since a same flow must 
be able to be reassigned to a different plane in case of path 
faults. Therefore, inflection requests intercepted at the edge 
switch must be sent to a controller for further processing. 
Rather than overloading a centralized controller however, this 
decision can be taken locally - since the inflector manages 
the local rules associated to each virtual network, it already 
has full knowledge of the routing table associated to each 
plane. Upon receiving such a request, the inflector proceeds 
in three steps. It first verifies which virtual networks maintain 
a valid route for the given destination address. Given this list of 
potential planes, it then inspects local policy to verify which 
planes the packet is allowed to use. The intercepted packet 
contains the plane which the flow is currently using - this 
plane should be excluded from the candidate list unless there 
is no other option available. Finally, a single plane, identified 
by an interior forwarding label, is selected from the resulting 
list of candidates. The selection algorithm is not prescribed by 
the INFLEX specification, but a reasonable baseline is to select 
a routing entry proportionally to the assigned route weight. 
Having selected an appropriate plane, the inflector installs 
forwarding rules into either inflection table. In the inbound 
direction, all packets matching the reverse flow are set to be 
marked with the corresponding INF label. This conveys the 
selected forwarding plane back to the host. In the outbound 
direction, all packets matching the flow are to be processed 
according to the label. This guarantees that any packet sent 
between the inflection request and its response are forwarded 
in a consistent manner. Rules installed to the inflection tables 
are ephemeral by nature, with a hard timeout of 1 second 
(the minimum permitted in the OpenFlow standard). This 
enables per-flow granularity with minimum flow state while 
also rate limiting inflection requests. Furthermore, flow entries 
can be configured to be sent to the controller upon expiry. This 
potentially allows the inflector to collect realtime information 
on the availability of each forwarding plane, allowing for 
further refinement of the plane selection algorithm. 
V. ANALYSIS 
This section details the evaluation of INFLEX as well as 
details pertaining to its implementation. A reference implemen­
tation of the inflector was developed as a component of the 
POX network controller [10]. Additionally, INFLEX support 
for TCP was added to the Linux kernel, and is available as 
a small patch for version 3.8. All source code, as well as a 
virtual machine to replicate subsequent tests, is being made 
publicly available. The use of POX in particular invalidates any 
rigorous performance evaluation, as the implementation is not 
geared towards efficiency. Instead, the contributed code acts 
as a proof-of-concept for INFLEX, allowing the mechanics of 
the specification to be inspected and fine-tuned. 
Open vSwitch 1.9 and OpenFlow 1.1 are used, enabling 
multiple table support. Unfortunately, current versions of 
OpenFlow do not support bitmasking the TOS field, and as 
such ECN bits are cleared when assigning INFLEX tags. 
This is a current limitation of OpenFlow which will likely be 
addressed in future versions in order to support manipulating 
the DS field while keeping the ECN field unchanged. 
A simple evaluation scenario is used, illustrated in Figure 
7. On one end is an INFLEX capable domain: a set of 
Fig. 7: Simulation setup. 
virtual hosts acting as servers connected to an Open vSwitch 
edge switch controlled by an inflector. On the other end is 
a remote client. Typically this is an end-user device outside 
network operator control. We assume that the client is running 
a legacy network stack and connected to a switch with no SDN 
functionality. A single physical connection between the client 
and this switch acts as the bottleneck for all flows, with the 
bandwidth set to 10Mb/so The edge switch has four potential 
planes over which it can forward traffic between the servers 
and the client. We simulate failures within the INFLEX domain 
by artificially dropping all forwarded packets belonging to a 
given plane; we denote this plane as being down. At any given 
moment one of the four available planes is down; each such 
simulated failure lasts for 15 seconds at a time, affecting planes 
cyclically. The reverse path, connecting from client to server, 
is always assumed to be functional. Propagation delay between 
both switches is set to 50ms. 
A. Sender-side resilience 
The first case study under review is one of the most 
common use cases for datacenters: a remote client download­
ing data from hosted servers. Under the conditions described 
previously, the forwarding path will be periodically affected 
by recurring failures. Since the nature and the origin of the 
fault are not always apparent to network devices, it is assumed 
that network elements within the INFLEX domain have no 
indication of the ongoing failure. Instead, it is up to the 
servers to detect and recover from perceived problems by 
issuing inflection requests. Clearly, requesting a path incurs 
some cost to network and host alike. For the network, an 
inflection request requires additional processing. For the host, 
this processing manifests itself as increased delay. This begs 
the question: when should a host request an inflection? The 
obvious candidate is to piggyback inflection requests on re­
transmissions spawned by retransmission timeouts (RTO). This 
leverages an existing transport mechanism which is well un­
derstood and only triggered under anomalous path conditions 
(as opposed to congestive losses). From the perspective of the 
host, any delay incurred by the inflection request is amortized 
by the retransmission timeout itself, which has a minimum 
value of 1 second. From the perspective of the network, such 
inflection requests should be both rare, reducing the amount 
of processing required, and critical to improve availability, 
justifying the expense in addressing them. 
Figure 8 displays the congestion window over time for two 
concurrent flows towards a remote client. The first connection 
traced is a download from a server without INFLEX support, 
in which all packets are forwarded over the default path. 
The vertical lines signal the points at which the default 
forwarding path, plane 0, fails. Despite only failing for 15sec, 
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Fig. 8: Congestion window for concurrent downloads towards 
client from legacy (above) and INFLEX (below) servers. 
the disruption to the transport flow lasts twice as long due 
to the exponential nature of the retransmission timeout, which 
doubles in duration at each occurrence. The second connection 
traced is a download occurring in parallel from an INFLEX 
capable server. In this case, each path failure is recovered by 
sending an inflection request on each retransmission timeout. 
The returned path is randomly assigned, as our basic proof­
of-concept inflector does not currently keep track of network 
conditions. The time between path failure and flow recovery 
is directly tied to the RTO, in this case taking approximately 
one second. This value cannot be improved upon within the 
INFLEX framework, as the duration of flow entries introduced 
by inflection requests has a minimum timeout of 1 second. 
Conveniently however, this matches the lower bound of the 
RTO as defined by TCP, and it is therefore unlikely that a 
transport protocol would desire faster fail-over. In practice, 
the recovery time may be extended in order to account for 
spurious timeouts. For connections over wireless media in 
particular, timeouts may occur due to transient effects such 
as interference. While this is functionally equivalent to path 
failure, the transient nature of such events does not always 
require changes to the forwarding path. 
An interesting implication of Figure 8 is that TCP senders 
using INFLEX can accommodate path fail-over seamlessly. 
Retransmissions conveniently distinguish between congestion 
events, triggering fast retransmission and similar heuristics, 
and pathological network conditions, which spawn repeated 
retransmission timeouts. In the case of the latter, the adopted 
response is to reset the congestion window and resume slow 
start - effectively restarting the flow. This behaviour is ex­
tremely conservative, but is a natural corollary of assuming as 
little as possible about the underlying network. As a result, 
no substantial change is required to the congestion control 
mechanisms employed by TCP in retrofitting cross-layer path 
fail-over at the sender using INFLEX. 
B. Receiver-side resilience 
Path failures can also affect the reverse path with equally 
nefarious consequences: the sender will repeatedly timeout in 
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INFLEX (below) receivers. 
the absence of acknowledgements from the receiver. Unlike 
failures affecting the forward path however, the INFLEX 
host does not actively track the reliability of the ongoing 
connection. TCP is sender driven, with receivers primarily 
generating acknowledgements as a response to inbound data. 
Hence, the reverse path lacks the reliable delivery mechanisms 
available in the forward path; if the TCP Timestamp option 
is not used, the receiver often lacks even an accurate RTT 
estimate. Furthermore, in the absence of data packets to be 
sent, there is no RTO on which to trigger inflection requests. 
A receiver must instead rely on inferring path failure 
from the packet inter-arrival time when generating duplicate 
acknowledgements. With the exception of cases where imme­
diate receiver feedback is required, such as a TCP timestamp 
request, duplicate acknowledgements are typically sent on the 
arrival of out-of-order data. Under path failure, the arrival time 
between such out-of-order events will rise exponentially as 
the sender TCP stack becomes tied to its own retransmission 
timeout. This behaviour is illustrated in figures 9 and 10, which 
show the result of using INFLEX with the same experimental 
setup but a reversed flow of data. Figure 9 displays the 
evolution of the congestion window size over time as the client 
uploads data concurrently to both a legacy and an INFLEX 
server. While the single forwarding path does not experience 
outages, the reverse path is periodically affected by failures. 
The corresponding data packet inter-arrival time is shown in 
Figure 10, with each sample point also displaying the routing 
plane used. For an ongoing TCP flow with sufficient data from 
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the application layer the packet inter-arrival time at the receiver 
should be consistently low. RTT level dynamics are apparent 
on slow start, in which the sender is clocked by incoming 
ACKs, and during congestion events, in which out-of-order 
delivery temporarily affects the throughput. On path failure 
however, the inter-arrival time increases exponentially, with 
each inbound packet triggering a duplicate acknowledgement. 
For the upload to the legacy server, successive RTOs result in 
a recovery time of nearly 30sec. 
An INFLEX receiver can use this information to decide 
when to trigger an inflection request. It can achieve this 
by setting a threshold for the time elapsed between dupli­
cate acknowledgements, henceforth referred to as dupthresh. 
Comparatively to the sender, the receiver should be more 
conservative, as by design it has less information on which to 
act upon and does not typically exert control on the congestive 
feedback loop. Furthermore, neither sender nor receiver can 
reliably detect whether the forward or reverse path are at 
fault. By acting conservatively, a receiver allows the sender, 
which may also be INFLEX capable, to initiate recovery 
before trying to correct the reverse path. For the experiment 
displayed in Figure 10, the dupthresh is set to twice the RTO, 
resulting in an overall downtime of approximately 3 seconds. 
Since each data point is generated on inbound data packets, 
recovery is signalled by a packet pair. A first inbound packet 
exceeding dupthresh triggers an inflection request, which 
piggybacks on the acknowledgement sent out in response. 
A second inbound packet returns approximately 1 RTT later 
with the forwarding plane assigned by the network attached. 
Clearly some failures may not be recoverable, particularly if 
the remote host is not INFLEX capable and the fault lies on 
the reverse path. Nonetheless, the overhead incurred at the 
host is negligible, merely complementing congestion avoidance 
mechanisms with additional signalling. Remarkably, INFLEX 
incurs no additional memory costs at the host, operating as 
an extended API over the existing ineCconnection socket, 
rendering it equally applicable to all transport protocols which 
use this socket structure, such as SCTP and DCCP. 
C. Network overhead 
The granularity at which an SDN deployment should 
manage traffic is often subject to debate. On one hand, hard­
ware advances such as TCAMs offer fast lookup times over 
large tables, affording flow precision for many potential SDN 
deployments. On the other, deployments will often include 
cheaper, more flexible software switches which are less capable 
of scaling performance with the number of flow entries. 
Importantly, operating on a per-flow granularity is more likely 
to overload the controller, which itself can be a considerable 
source of latency. As a result, managing flow aggregates is 
often the preferred means of reducing this overhead, at the 
cost of flexibility in affecting flows individually. 
INFLEX does neither strictly, exerting network control at a 
sub-flow granularity while pushing flow state to the end-host. 
Figure 11 investigates the relative expected overhead incurred 
by the network on adopting such an architecture. The graph 
tracks the mean flow state from applying different flow entry 
policies for outbound traffic in the MAWI dataset. The solid 
lines track the resulting flow table size if traditional per-flow 
state were maintained, with every unique five tuple inserting 
a table entry for the entirety of the flow's lifetime. This is 
equivalent to the mean number of flows at the observed link 
and is further refined according to whether data was traced for 
the unique five tuple. For domains which exchange traffic with 
the wider Internet, per-flow state can be particularly crippling 
as malicious SYN floods and port scans regularly inflate the 
required state in the network. Such attacks had visible impact 
in 2011 in particular, nearly doubling the number of flows. 
INFLEX however inserts ephemeral rules in response to 
inflection requests. For the worst possible case, all existing 
flows would trigger an inflection request simultaneously -
matching the overhead incurred by a per-flow approach. In 
practice even this is overly pessimistic, as an inflector could 
resort to a per-aggregate granularity in the case of widespread 
outages. Actual network state would strongly depend on the 
exact inflection strategy adopted by the transport protocol. 
One practical reference point is to investigate the resulting 
overhead if paths were requested on flow start, as this number 
will exceed retransmission timeouts under normal operating 
conditions. This is further illustrated in Figure 11, which 
also tracks flow table size if each unique five tuple were to 
only generate a flow entry for 1 second, the minimum expiry 
time for OpenFlow. This is functionally equivalent to the flow 
arrival rate, and determines the expected number of requests 
per second sent to the controller. The resulting flow table size 
is reduced dramatically in comparison to the traditional case 
where state is allocated for the duration of the flow, and the 
order of magnitude difference is crucial for software switches 
in particular. However, under such conditions state becomes 
more strained by the large fluctuations imposed by DOS 
attacks, suggesting that inflection requests should only be used 
after connection establishment; this corresponds to the grey 
dotted line in Figure 11. Importantly, such an approach also 
opens the possibility of using inflection requests for assisting 
traffic management in addition to enabling improved resilience. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presented INFLEX, a scalable and easily de­
ployable end-to-end resilience framework based on the cross­
layer control of an SDN-enabled network layer. The proposed 
architecture is shown to perform end-to-end path fail-over 
on much shorter time scales than existing solutions and is 
inherently modular, providing failure recovery through cooper­
ation between end-hosts and the IP network. In comparison to 
reliability mechanisms operating purely at the transport layer, 
INFLEX enables resilience when communicating with legacy 
endpoints and does not require host multi-homing. Conversely, 
when compared to mechanisms operating purely at the net­
work layer, INFLEX provides end-to-end visibility into path 
failures, allowing both fast detection and fine-grained network 
control over recovery. The architecture design presented is 
implemented as a set of extensions to the Linux kernel and 
a popular Open Flow controller and evaluated experimentally, 
demonstrating that high availability over multiple routing 
planes can be achieved without compromising scalability. 
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